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Abstract 
Chile has become the paradigm of nation branding in Latin America, employing 
branding initiatives to try to shake off the uncomfortable past of Augusto Pinochet’s 
dictatorship, as well as to create a ‘new’ image that fits into a globalised and neoliberal 
world. Whilst there has previously been some analysis of Chile’s branding efforts, the 
viewpoints of the local actors involved in these initiatives have largely been ignored. This 
article addresses this issue, examining the tensions faced by different individuals who 
have taken part in nation branding in the country. Drawing on interviews with some of 
these individuals, this article examines three areas of tension: (1) the conflicting 
purposes guiding the practice of nation branding, (2) the difficulties around the 
operationalisation of nation branding and (3) the controversies regarding the intended 
audiences for their efforts. 
Introduction 
In September 2008 I joined –along with five other colleagues– Ogilvy Public Relations 
Chile to work as an account executive on a new and ambitious project to promote Chile 
abroad. The stakes were high and exciting. Our client, the Export Promotion Bureau 
ProChile, told us that, although located in a peripheral or semi-peripheral geopolitical 
position,1 Chile was a country with great potential, with resources such as stunning 
geography, political stability and high quality food exports, as well as a good economic 
performance since the mid-1980s. We were informed that Chile was invisible to most 
people, and that such invisibility was detrimental to Chile’s future economic prospects. 
Consumers were unaware of the strength of Chilean exports and investors did not have 
enough information about the opportunities offered by the country. We had been hired to 
change that. As part of the newly formed Proyecto Chile –Imagen País (Chilean National 
Image Project), we were responsible for implementing a strategy to make Chile better 
2known in seven countries considered ‘priority markets’: the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Spain, Germany, Mexico, Japan and China.  
The strategy was guided by the nation branding hexagon proposed by British consultant 
Simon Anholt,2 who had been recently hired by the Chilean government. The hexagon 
focuses on six indicators of a national brand: exports, governance, investment and 
immigration, culture and heritage, people and tourism.3 Using those indicators as guides, 
we organized press trips for foreign journalists and bloggers; we sought potential stories 
that could portray Chile in a positive light for international news media, and we proudly 
highlighted the fact that Quantum of Solace, then the most recent James Bond movie, had 
been partially filmed in Chile. The project was supposed to last several years and 
incorporate more ‘priority markets’ over time. However, only six months later it was 
over. A new private but publicly funded organisation, Fundación Imagen de Chile (Image 
of Chile Foundation), had been created to develop and manage a narrative designed to 
make Chile more visible all over the world.    
Although short-lived, my experience working at Ogilvy Public Relations Chile marked 
the beginning of a personal journey. Over the next two years I worked on two smaller 
projects promoting specific characteristics of Chile abroad, before starting to critically 
engage with this topic from an academic viewpoint. It also signalled the beginning of a 
series of public debates among local politicians, businessmen and authorities about how 
to construct and project abroad a positive national image or marca país (‘country brand’
in Spanish, the term locally used to refer to nation branding).4 Such brand did not intend 
to merely encompass a territory, but also a set of political, economic and cultural 
characteristics that allegedly made Chile unique. Significantly, it was claimed that a good 
brand had the supposed potential of improving Chile’s position in the international arena. 
Hence, concerns about Chile’s international reputation were predominantly framed as 
discussions about nation branding. Various domestic episodes –such as the earthquake of 
March 2010, the rescue of 33 Chilean miners in October 2010 and the performance of the 
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potential to positively or negatively affect the ‘Chile brand’.5
Despite the social, political and economic significance attached to nation branding in 
Chile, which has been noticed by foreign observers,6 the viewpoints of the actors behind 
local nation branding initiatives have been largely neglected.7 Early nation branding 
studies –both critical works as well as those aimed at practitioners– were dominated by 
case studies from the United States and Western Europe. The global spread of nation 
branding led various authors to examine examples from Asia, Africa and Eastern 
Europe.8 Latin America was predominantly ignored in the literature. Whilst recent studies 
have paid attention to the region,9 they have mostly provided an analysis of media 
coverage, documents and specific campaigns. Therefore, this article seeks to address this 
neglected topic, shedding light on the tensions that some of the individuals constructing 
and projecting a particular version of Chile through nation branding have faced for the 
last decade.  
The discussion has five sections. The first looks at the theoretical aspects, and suggests 
that nation branding is a manifestation of Dijkink’s ‘geopolitical visions’.10 Hence, I 
argue that the concept of visibility is particularly useful for analysing the purposes, 
operationalisation and intended audiences of the individuals involved in nation branding. 
The historical context is then considered to further understand the emergence and 
embrace of nation branding in Chile. I next examine the difficulties of making a single 
national brand visible to individuals and organisations with diverse and sometimes 
opposite goals. I outline then some of the tensions cited by practitioners in regard to the 
operationalisation of nation branding. Finally, I discuss some of the controversies they 
faced in relation to the audiences to whom direct their efforts.  
4Nation Branding, Geopolitical Visions and Visibility 
Along with public diplomacy, nation branding is the most recent incarnation of the task 
of projecting a positive image of a nation abroad. Whilst there are competing definitions 
of what nation branding is, there is some consensus that it is the use of marketing and 
advertising techniques to enhance the reputation of a nation.11 Since the late 1990s, 
governments from all over the world have spent hefty sums of money engaging in various 
initiatives that promise to re-build and project ‘new’ or ‘updated’ versions of national 
identity, in order to advance political, economic and or cultural agendas.12 Nation 
branding advocates claim that the globalisation of capitalism and the spread of 
communication technologies made the international image or reputation of a nation as 
important as economic or military power.13 Van Ham argues that the increasing relevance 
of nation branding signals a shift from geopolitics and power to an emphasis on symbols 
and influences.14 Yet nation branding does not necessarily imply a complete departure 
from geopolitics. Rather, it introduces a new level of complexity for their analysis.15
Nation branding can be understood as a manifestation of what Dijkink calls ‘geopolitical 
visions’, that is, ‘any idea concerning the relation between one’s own and other places, 
involving feelings of (in)security or (dis)advantage (and/or) invoking ideas about a 
collective mission or foreign policy strategy’.
Whilst works for practitioners dominated the early nation branding literature,16 in recent 
times an increasing number of studies have addressed this phenomenon from a more 
critical viewpoint. Studies have drawn on theoretical concepts and perspectives from 
sociology, media and communications, anthropology, and international relations, among 
other fields.17 These analyses have made substantial contributions, highlighting how 
nation branding initiatives commodify national identity and craft a fairly homogenous 
version of the nation, which masks diversity and internal conflicts.18 In this article, I do 
draw on that critical literature. However, I depart from these works theoretically, 
proposing that the concept of visibility can be helpful when examining nation branding as 
geopolitical visions in practice. Approaching nation branding through the concept of 
visibility means taking into account not only the visible –campaigns, slogans, taglines, 
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the individuals behind nation branding efforts.19
The concept of visibility is often mentioned in the literature, for instance, when claiming 
that nation branding initiatives enable nations to ‘achieve greater visibility’.20 However, it 
is rarely theorised. Only in the last fifteen years have various theorists and researchers 
from sociology, urban studies, gender studies, and media and communications focussed 
on scrutinising what visibility is and what its implications are. Thompson has studied 
how technological advances have contributed to the development of a ‘new visibility’, 
with the production of a greater number of images that can potentially achieve a wider 
geographical reach.21 Significantly, Thompson observes that visibility, particularly 
through the media, ‘has become a principal means by which social and political struggles 
are articulated and carried out’.22 Visibility has become a political concern,23 ‘a right 
frequently and sometimes violently claimed; a right that all sorts of people feel entitled to 
obtain’.24 Such perspectives understand visibility as a means to achieve political 
recognition and representation. Similarly, nation branding advocates claim that the 
visibility of the nation is not only a right, but a necessity.25 Lacking a well-defined 
national brand means being left behind in the global competition for capital, tourism and 
political influence. The argument follows that governments must not only struggle for the 
visibility of the nation, but also control the terms of such visibility, managing its 
construction and projection to achieve their goal. Hence, nation branding proposes 
geopolitical ‘visions of order’ to maximise potential advantages and mitigate risks in the 
international arena.26
Yet visibility is not merely a source of recognition, but also a form of surveillance. Being 
seen can be a way to be policed and subject to discipline and control.27 Foucault famously 
stated that visibility was ‘a trap’28 when writing about the Panopticon, a prison model in 
which inmates do not know whether or not they are being observed by guards. 
Furthermore, recognition and control are not in direct opposition to each other. They may 
in fact overlap. For instance, the development of a nation brand seeks to enhance 
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behaviour suitable for the global market.29 Hence, as Brighenti holds, ‘a way of seeing is 
a way of recognising and, at the same time, controlling’.30
Despite the political implications of visibility, Banet-Weiser observes that practitioners 
and some theorists have increasingly shifted their attention from the politics of visibility
towards the economies of visibility.31 Whist the politics of visibility focus on how 
traditionally marginalised groups seek visibility as a means to produce further political –
and geopolitical– change, the economies of visibility understand visibility as an end in 
itself. From this perspective, visibility is a way to facilitate the transaction of specific 
products –such as bodies, goods or, in this case, nation brands– in a market. When 
viewed from a predominantly economic perspective, questions about the purposes, modes 
of operationalisation as well as targeted audiences –the what, how and for whom– of 
those seeking visibility are often overlooked.32 Hence, a critical engagement with the 
concept of visibility may stress the (geo)political aspect of nation branding. Indeed, a 
thorough examination of visibility means addressing not only what is seen –logos, 
marketing campaigns, slogans–, but also sociocultural contexts, beliefs as well as the 
practices of the individuals taking part in the production of nation branding.33 As Voirol 
observes, ways of doing are also ways of seeing.34
The use of visibility as a theoretical framework highlights the need to scrutinise the 
discourses and viewpoints of the actors producing nation branding initiatives. The critical 
nation branding literature has increasingly addressed the perspectives of the individuals 
engaged in these initiatives in a series of settings.35 Furthermore, as Kaneva suggests, 
nation branding studies should adopt a materialist perspective in order to ‘uncover the 
structural conditions and processes which underlie the ascendance of nation branding to a 
hegemonic status in contemporary international relations’.36 Some of those conditions 
and processes are outlined in the next section, which provides some historical context to 
further understand the emergence and embracing of nation branding in Chile. 
7Context: Nation Branding in Chile 
Whilst nation branding originated in the United Kingdom and the United States, elites 
from ‘emerging’ or ‘developing’ nations –such as those from Latin America– have 
enthusiastically followed the advice of nation branding advocates and experts.37 For the 
governments of Peru, Colombia, Mexico and Chile, among others, nation branding has 
represented a relatively cheap way to enhance the visibility of their nations abroad in 
order to favourably shape geopolitical visions. Local authorities have attempted to leave 
behind perceptions of exoticism, dictatorial governments, failed economies, or pre-
modernity in order to attain political, cultural but mostly economic goals.38 The positive 
reception of nation branding in Latin America has to be examined through the prism of 
broader historical processes. Despite various episodes of internal debate and contestation, 
nation building in Latin America was traditionally a top-down process. States 
constructed, fostered –often violently– and projected a sense of homogeneous national 
identity amongst heterogeneous and geographically dispersed peoples. Latin American 
states have tried to maintain control over specific versions and visions of what 
supposedly constitutes the authentic nations that they claim to represent.39
In Chile, having secured independence from Spain in the early 19th century, local political 
and economic elites selected the representative features of the newly-formed nation, 
abandoning those considered undesirable.40 Nation branding is compatible with these 
historical aspirations. Despite claims made by nation branding advocates about the need 
to involve the general population to identify the ‘core idea’ –or, using Dijkink’s 
terminology, the ‘collective mission’– of a nation,41 the final decisions regarding what 
constitutes the national brand are taken by a narrow group of individuals. It is expected 
that the rest of the population merely adapt to the decisions taken by elites, disciplining 
and adjusting their behaviour to contribute to the enactment of a national portrayal 
appealing to foreigners.42
8Attempts to construct a positive image of Chile for foreigners can be found in the 19th
century. These attempts were primarily driven by economic goals. State-sponsored 
chronicles written by Chilean authors sought to attract potential Western European 
immigrants, in the hope that these immigrants would contribute to the development of the 
southern regions of the country. Publicly and privately funded campaigns promoting 
Chile abroad were pitched at increasing saltpetre sales. This mineral became one of the 
pillars of the Chilean economy at the end of the 19th century.43 Yet the seeds of the 
current attempts to construct and project a version of Chile for foreigners can be found in 
the mid-1980s, when the local Export Promotion Bureau, ProChile, developed a 
campaign to boost exports to the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Japan and 
Singapore, through the depiction of Chile as an economically open and low-risk nation.44
An emphasis on economic virtues, underpinned by the neoliberal turn taken by Chile in 
the late 1970s, aimed to counteract the political isolation faced during the military 
dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet.45
With the end of Pinochet's dictatorship in 1990, Chile’s new authorities attempted to 
project a fresh image of their country, to secure its re-entry into the global arena, ridding 
itself of any connection with the Pinochet regime. For the Seville Expo 1992, the Chilean 
pavilion had an iceberg as its main attraction. The iceberg attempted to differentiate Chile 
from the rest of Latin America, depicting the country as a cold, formal and serious.46
Significantly, the new democratically elected Chilean government sought to distance 
itself from the previous regime in political terms, whilst keeping the same economic 
model.  
In the mid-2000s, the Chilean government hired foreign marketing and advertising 
specialists to develop a proposal for a marca país or nation brand.47 A motivation to 
create such a brand was the need to strengthen exports and increase investment in the 
light of several free trade agreements in negotiation, such as those with the United States 
and the European Union. As mentioned earlier, one of the advisors was Simon Anholt, 
the British branding consultant who coined the term ‘nation-brands’ –originally with a 
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Bachelet. His hiring also resulted in the inclusion of Chile in Anholt’s Nation Brand 
Index (NBI). Anholt travelled all over the country in a series of well-publicised 
encounters with local politicians, businessmen, academics and artists, where he stressed 
the urgent need to develop a national brand to surmount the supposed invisibility of Chile 
in the international arena.49
In 2009 the Chilean authorities launched Fundación Imagen de Chile (Image of Chile 
Foundation), a private but publicly funded organisation to develop and sustain a narrative 
designed to make Chile more visible in the global imaginary.50 Whilst officials working 
at the foundation have stressed that their work is for the long term, its active campaigns 
have reflected the concerns of the government in power. During the administration of 
Sebastián Piñera, who led the country between 2010 and 2014, the foundation developed 
the campaign ‘Chile is good for you’ –‘Chile hace bien’ in Spanish, which means both
‘Chile is good for you’ and ‘Chile works well’–,51 which emphasised the country’s 
political stability, stunning geography and the resiliency of its people. This campaign was 
scrapped with the return of Michelle Bachelet to the Presidency in 2014, and replaced by 
another one that did not have a specific slogan, which stressed Chile as a trustworthy 
country, moving towards progress, with a mixture of tradition and modernity and an 
extreme geography.52
Notably, most of the features that have defined the global phenomenon of nation 
branding are present in the case of Chile: the need to shake off an uncomfortable past; the 
creation of a ‘new’ image which could fit into a perceived globalised, neoliberal world; 
the hiring of foreign experts for this task; and the development of new state-sponsored 
institutions that attempt to construct, enhance and manage the visibility of a particular 
version of the nation. Indeed, Chile has been considered a success story that should be 
imitated by other Latin American governments, such as Brazil.53
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A Methodological Note 
As stated earlier, the viewpoints of the individuals engaged in nation branding in Chile 
have largely been neglected in the literature. To address this gap, I conducted seven semi-
structured interviews with individuals who have taken part in the development and 
implementation of nation branding initiatives in Chile.54 All of them worked for the main 
public and private organisations that have been involved in nation branding initiatives in 
the country during the last decade: Image of Chile Foundation, ProChile, Ogilvy Public 
Relations and FutureBrand. Some of the interviewees have worked in both the public and 
private sector at different times. The interviews were conducted in Spanish, between 
March 2013 and September 2016. All interviewees requested anonymity, as most of them 
have remained involved directly or indirectly in the implementation of nation branding. 
Hence, I have changed their names and I mention their affiliation –or previous– at the 
time of the interview. My contact with some of them was facilitated by the fact that, as 
mentioned earlier, between 2008 and 2010 I worked as an account executive for Ogilvy 
Public Relations Chile on different nation branding projects. Indeed, I experienced 
directly some of the issues raised by the interviewees, which are addressed later in this 
article.  
I conducted a thematic analysis of the seven interviews to identify some of the main 
subjects raised by the informants and to examine how they understood these topics.55 I do 
not claim that this is an exhaustive study with such a limited number of respondents. It 
should be seen as the starting point for wider debates about nation branding in Chile as 
well as Latin America. I grouped the topics from the analysis of the interviews into three 
interrelated areas that follow the previous theoretical discussion about visibility. The 
areas of tension address the purposes (the what), operationalisation (the how) and the 
intended audiences (for whom) of nation branding initiatives in Chile. More concretely, 
the topics I examine are: What was the image of Chile that the interviewees were trying 
to make visible through nation branding initiatives? How did they operationalize the 
construction and projection of such image? To whom were they trying to communicate 
that particular national brand? 
11
Purposes: What Image of Chile should be made visible? 
The first tension raised by the interviewees relates to the version of Chile that they tried 
to make visible. As discussed earlier, there have been various incarnations of nation 
branding in Chile, including the early attempts by ProChile in the mid 2000s, and the 
different campaigns carried out by the Fundación Imagen de Chile since its inception in 
2009. Despite the differences in approaches and the different aims of the organisations 
involved in nation branding, all interviewees concluded that the main driving force 
behind nation branding was the attainment of economic goals.  
All interviewees stressed that features such as political stability, stunning geography and 
the warmth of the Chileans were equally important, but were relevant insofar as they 
were beneficial for Chile’s economy. Geography was important for tourism; political 
stability was required for foreign investment; and the character of Chileans mattered as 
evidence of a supposed entrepreneurial spirit. Interviewees agreed that their task was to 
portray Chile mostly as an economic unit, which produced raw materials, was suitable for 
foreign investment, and was an attractive tourist destination for foreigners. Fernando, 
from Fundación Imagen de Chile, observed that diplomats often instructed their embassy 
and consular communications teams to sell Chile abroad (personal communication, 
2014). Such emphasis shows the previously discussed economies of visibility at play. 
Indeed, nation branding is a manifestation of what has been called ‘commercial 
nationalism’ or ‘economic nationalism’, that is, the primacy of economic practices as 
markers of nationhood, as well as the adoption of an economic viewpoint to evaluate the 
legitimacy of institutions.56
Despite the consensus that Chile had to be shown primarily as an economic unit, different 
actors disagreed on the features that should be emphasised or masked in order to generate 
economic benefits. A former ProChile official and a former Ogilvy Public Relations 
Chile executive recalled that the first attempt to produce a nation brand for Chile was 
signalled by the adoption of the tagline ‘Chile, All Ways Surprising’ (‘Chile, Sorprende 
12
Siempre’ in Spanish), developed by the branding company InterBrand in 2005. The logo 
and respective tagline aimed to show a ‘new’ Chile, with stars that supposedly signalled 
not only the beauty of the Chilean sky, but most significantly, a continuously moving and 
innovative business oriented nation which respected its past.57 The depiction of a nation 
as a mixture of tradition and modernity is far from original. The Janus-like face of 
nationhood, with ‘backward’ nations looking for stability in their past while at the same 
time embracing modernity,58 has become a staple of nation branding campaigns all over 
the world.59 Significantly, the excitement that the ‘All Ways Surprising’ campaign tried 
to communicate was soon subject to criticism within the government, which perceived it 
to have the potential to undermine the goals of various state agencies. As David, former 
official of ProChile, recalled: 
That brand [Chile, All Ways Surprising] was launched amidst lots of hype. There was tons of 
stationery ready and so on, but after a couple of months, the Foreign Investment Committee asked 
ProChile to remove the tagline. They said that the last thing an investor was going to find 
attractive was a country full of surprises. They preferred a country that was predictable, reliable 
and boring. The surprises worked mainly for tourists. So we ended up keeping the logo with the 
stars, but the tagline was scrapped (personal communication, 2013).     
David’s quote describes the supposed unsuitability of ‘All Ways Surprising’ to attract 
investment.60 It is also illustrative of a phenomenon that was cited by most interviewees. 
Despite their agreement about the relevance of carrying out nation branding initiatives for 
the attainment of economic purposes, interviewees stressed the difficulty of coordinating 
the various public and private entities, with their own individual goals, when putting 
these initiatives into practice.  
As mentioned earlier, the literature has examined how nation branding practitioners in 
various settings have faced several challenges –especially among themselves – when 
putting their initiatives into practice.61 Significantly The Fundación Imagen de Chile was 
created to coordinate nation branding work so mitigating controversies regarding Chile’s 
nation brand, but this proved difficult sometimes. Fernando, a former Fundación official, 
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recalled that during the global media frenzy after the 2010 rescue of 33 Chilean miners, 
the then President Sebastián Piñera wanted to change the campaign name ‘Chile is good 
for you’ to ‘Do it the Chilean way’ –the motto was in English language only–, which 
were supposedly Barack Obama’s words when discussing the successful rescue with 
Piñera. According to Fernando, various senior officials resisted Piñera’s efforts not only 
because ‘Chile is good for you’ was about to be launched, but also because they feared 
that ‘Do it the Chilean Way’ would become a source of parodies and jokes within Chile: 
Can you imagine how people would have mocked that sentence every time something did not 
work? It could have been very harmful in the long term (personal communication, 2014).  
The examples above highlight that, despite agreement about the supposed benefits of 
nation branding, harmony and coordination amongst the parties involved in these efforts 
are the exception rather than the rule. Hence, at the heart of nation branding lies a 
paradox: the promise to make visible a single and coordinated version of the nation, 
albeit with the involvement of individuals and organisations that actually have diverse
and often opposite goals.62 Unsurprisingly, the promise of a coordinated version of the 
nation is rarely fulfilled. At best, it is possible to agree on making shallow statements. 
This is true for Chile’s current nation brand, which holds that the country has a diverse 
geography, a mixture of tradition and modernity, and people who are trustworthy and 
committed to progress.63 These features are hardly exclusive to Chile. Indeed, most 
interviewees openly expressed their doubts about the possibility of constructing and 
managing the visibility of a coordinated image of Chile. At the centre of these doubts was 
the realisation that it was almost impossible to reach a complete consensus regarding 
national identity. As Marcela, a former Fundación Imagen de Chile official stated:  
It is difficult to project outwards issues that have not been agreed internally. That is why I believe 
that the Fundación had a relevant role in bringing into the public domain the discussion about the 
kind of country that we are, where we want to go and what kind of future projects we have. And 
this narrative cannot be totalitarian, because there are spaces in which there simply is no 
agreement (personal communication, 2013).
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This quote shows that finding the alleged ‘core idea’ or ‘collective mission’ of a nation, 
as encouraged by nation branding enthusiasts,64 is, in practical terms, an extremely 
difficult and perhaps even unattainable task. Nonetheless, the recognition that agreement 
may be impossible does not necessarily result in enrichment of debates about national 
identity, as proposed by some critical authors.65 As Marcela points out, in the Chilean 
case, discussions about what the nation is are still framed as a top-down process, 
managed by a state-sponsored organisation –‘the Fundación had a relevant role’. 
Furthermore, the final decision of what supposedly constitutes –and what does not– the 
Chilean national identity made visible by the brand remains in the hands of the 
foundation. Hence, paraphrasing Dayan, variability is ‘accepted but only within limits’, 
in this case, the limits imposed by Fundación Imagen de Chile.66
Operationalisation: How to Make Chile Visible? 
The second source of tension highlighted by interviewees relates to the operationalisation 
of nation branding. Despite the abundance of literature aimed at practitioners,67 the 
interviewees stated that there were no clear guidelines on how to implement as well as 
how to evaluate nation branding. I recall that, when working at Ogilvy Public Relations, 
we lacked clear instructions on how to empirically apply Anholt’s Nation Brand 
Hexagon.68 Given that the standard practice amongst public relation practitioners in our 
team was to produce press releases and measure success monitoring media coverage, we 
used the six sides of the hexagon as thematic categories to propose potential news stories 
and to classify media monitoring of Chile. Hence, whilst we adhered to Anholt’s model –
at least superficially–, our practices hardly explored any new grounds, given that we 
settled on an established set of procedures that the team felt comfortable with.  
The literature often describes how nation branding practitioners, driven by commercial 
imperatives, increasingly make decisions about national identity that were previously 
made by the state.69 However, the interviews showed that the operationalisation of nation 
branding and the prevalence of a commercial viewpoint were not entirely dependent on 
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practitioners. Outcomes such as slogans, videos or taglines were sometimes the product 
of political and financial pressures unrelated to purely promotional concerns. For 
instance, the 2010 launch of the previously mentioned campaign ‘Chile is good for you’ 
was marked by a promotional video uploaded to YouTube and broadcast in several 
European countries.70 As Marcela, former Fundación Imagen de Chile official stated, that 
video –along with various other campaign outcomes – was primarily produced as a 
response to a particular set of political requirements and expectations seeking to justify 
the work and budget of the recently established foundation: 
‘Chile is good for you’ was made because there was an expectation that the foundation had to 
deliver several products: a logo, a slogan and an important televisual advertisement. So it was 
begrudgingly that we produced a video in order to meet that expectation, do you understand? This 
is related to some political issues, regarding the distribution of the work between different state 
institutions, so it is not only about how you articulate Chile's communication strategy (personal 
communication, 2013).  
As Marcela revealed, the state agencies funding the work of Fundación Imagen de Chile
expected outcomes traditionally associated with branding and advertising, such as 
promotional logos and taglines. The fact that local politicians demanded precisely those 
outcomes reveals the level of dissemination and normalisation of the language and logics 
of branding and advertising within the state.71 Indeed, requirements such as those 
mentioned by Marcela are a manifestation of the increasingly popular adoption of 
corporate techniques by the public sector, spurred on by a growing demand for enhanced 
evaluation and measurement instruments, particularly concerning the reputation of 
organisations.72 Most interviewees also admitted that, despite the rhetoric of nation 
branding enthusiasts, there are no clear parameters to systematically measure and 
evaluate the development and management of the image of a nation. Hence, activities 
such as press report preparation, media coverage monitoring, and the production of 
advertising and marketing materials have become the de facto ways of evaluating and 
justifying the costs of nation branding initiatives. Significantly, although nation branding 
advocates claim that their goal is making the nation stand out in a global competitive 
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market, the fact that nation branding practitioners emulate their practices across various 
settings, makes the outcomes of these initiatives extremely similar all over the world.73
Notably, some nation branding practitioners were explicit in their dissatisfaction with the 
language and format of advertising. Depictions using standard marketing language were 
described as ‘inauthentic’. Their criticisms were not isolated. Simon Anholt has become 
an outspoken critic of the practices and promises of nation branding, albeit only for the 
purpose of re-labelling his work as ‘competitive identity’.74 According to Fernando, 
former Fundación Imagen de Chile official, the perfectionism of videos such as ‘Chile is 
good for you’ made difficult the visibility of the authentic nation:  
The aesthetic and the audiovisual strategy of ‘Chile is good for you’ shows a stunning Chile, with 
unique landscapes, exceptional natural resources and food delicacies, while, for example, the 
documentaries of ‘Living Atlas Chile’ show the truth. I mean, salmon fishing is difficult and fishes 
are not that beautiful. So the ‘Living Atlas’ does not mean that we are ugly or anything like that, 
but it wants to show the truth, without a professional camera and that perfect advertising language 
(personal communication, 2014). 
The ‘Living Atlas Chile’ (‘Atlas Vivo de Chile’), mentioned above by Fernando, was a 
series of short documentary films produced by Fundación Imagen de Chile in 2013 that 
aimed to show the lives of real Chileans.75 According to Marcela, who was involved in 
the development of the documentaries, the films attempted to enhance the visibility of 
‘ordinary’ Chileans. Hence, the ‘Atlas’ intended to address one of the main drivers 
behind the country’s nation branding efforts, namely the fact that ‘no one can picture a 
Chilean’.76 However, both Marcela and Fernando stated that officials within the 
foundation had heated discussions about the production of this series, due to, again, a 
lack of clarity regarding the approach to take and potential evaluation methods. 
Significantly, the different approaches taken on how to portray Chile in the ‘Living Atlas’ 
and ‘Chile is good for you’ led to the development of at least two parallel and 
disconnected accounts of the nation: one aimed at locals and one aimed at foreigners, 
both with radically different formats and messages. The invention of one single nation 
brand applicable across a variety of settings, and which could be embraced by both locals 
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and foreigners, proved to be an almost impossible task. In other words, the poetics of 
nation branding were halted significantly by the politics of its operationalisation.77
Audiences: For whom should Chile be made visible? 
The third and final tension highlighted by the interviewees refers to the audiences to 
whom nation branding efforts should be directed. The prevalence of the economies of 
visibility over the politics of visibility was particularly clear in this regard. Most 
interviewees did not speak of ‘audiences’, ‘publics’ or ‘countries’ to which nation 
branding initiatives had to be targeted. Instead, they spoke of ‘markets’. As mentioned in 
the introduction, that was the term employed when I worked in nation branding projects 
in the late 2000s. The reference to markets confirms that nation branding is a 
manifestation of ‘economic’ or ‘commercial nationalism’. Indeed, one of the promises 
made by nation branding advocates is the levelling of the international arena, namely, a 
redrawing of geopolitics. According to this argument, nation branding facilitates small 
and medium-sized nations located far from traditional power centres, and with limited 
material resources, to punch ‘above their weight’.78 However, claims of empowerment 
and levelling the field are misleading, because nation branding rarely, if ever, challenges 
power relations in the international arena.  
Nation branding does not merely aim to make visible the supposed authenticity –as long 
as it can be a source of profit– of a nation. As a manifestation of geopolitical visions, it 
also situates nations in specific places in the world, praising and criticising nations 
according to alleged universal parameters of behaviour and political and economic 
achievements.79 That is the role of rankings such as the already mentioned Nation Brand 
Index (NBI) as well as the Country Brand Index (CBI) by FutureBrand,80 to which the 
Chilean authorities have subscribed. In both indexes nations annually move upwards or 
downwards in the international arena, depending on how ‘well’ or ‘poorly’ their brand 
has performed. Significantly, the rankings demonstrate how visibility can be a source of 
both recognition and surveillance. Nation branding not only promises countries to be 
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recognised. It also seeks to discipline and control them, pushing them to embrace 
behaviours deemed as correct or desirable.81
Nation branding highlights the asymmetry of visibility relations among countries.82 Most 
nation branding consultants are based in the United Kingdom and the United States, with 
governments in the global south as clients.83 Indeed, the aforementioned rankings 
promoted by consultants reinforce the idea that the world is divided into ‘core’ and 
‘peripheral’ nations between which unequal power relations exist.84 The methodology 
used for the NBI and the CBI places much weight on interviews with individuals 
predominantly based in Western nations.85 In turn, ‘peripheral’ or ‘emerging’ nations 
such as Chile end up targeting most of their nation branding efforts at ‘core’ ones, such as 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany or Japan. Given the attention of ‘core’ 
nations is portrayed as a zero-sum game, nation branding advocates hold that competition 
for attention among nations is natural.86 Hence, nation branding is also a manifestation of 
the competition state, with the aim of ‘maintaining and promoting competitiveness in a 
world marketplace and multi-level political system’.87
Chile is ranked traditionally around number 35 of 50 nations in the NBI88 and is often 
regarded as the fourth Latin American nation brand in the Country Brand Index of 
FutureBrand.89 Whilst the stated aspiration of most interviewees was to gradually move 
Chile upwards to the top rankings, they admitted that this goal is probably going to take 
years or even decades to attain. Interviewees also recognised that most of Chile’s nation 
branding efforts were directed at ‘core’ nations from Western Europe and East Asia, as 
well as the United States. Whilst there have been specific campaigns targeted at 
audiences within the region90 -and Marcela, former official at Fundación Imagen de 
Chile observed that ‘Juan Gabriel [Valdés, first Executive Director of the foundation] 
originally wanted to focus efforts on improving relations with Peru, Bolivia, and better 
position Chile in South America’– Chile’s initiatives are rarely focussed on Latin 
America. Indeed, shortly afterwards the Chilean government announced in 2014 that 
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local nation branding efforts were going to include the continent,91 Carlos, an official 
from ProChile, stated: 
I really don’t like what they [at Fundación Imagen de Chile] are doing. We should be focussing on 
our markets, on our exports, and not on solving issues with our neighbours. That is an important 
issue, but I don’t think we should currently direct the limited resources we have for nation 
branding to do that. There are other state departments that are much more experienced and can do 
it better.   
Carlos admits that nation branding practitioners in Chile lack both the expertise and 
resources to deal with the fraught relationships with neighbouring countries. Similarly, 
Pedro, from Ogilvy Public Relations, held that Chile ‘should not be eager to please 
everyone’ (personal communication, 2014). Yet the country has a history of tense 
relationships with its neighbours, particularly Peru and Bolivia, due to conflicts that date 
back to the ‘War of the Pacific’ at the end of the 19th century. Indeed, in the last decade, 
both have taken Chile to the International Court of Justice to solve border disputes.92
Both Peru and Bolivia notably accompanied their legal efforts with communication 
campaigns that aimed to win public support for their legal arguments.93 Chile was a 
latecomer in developing communication efforts, partly because its focus on using nation 
branding to advance an economic agenda led the country to enhance its visibility almost 
exclusively before the eyes of ‘core’ nations or ‘priority markets’.94
The tension between the politics of visibility and the economies of visibility are at the core 
of Chile’s nation branding efforts. Nation branding advocates stress that a focus on the 
brand displaces the supposed aggressiveness of nationalism.95 Yet nation branding is ill 
equipped to deal both with conflict and the more complex intricacies of regional politics. 
Despite its promises of redrawing geopolitics through the empowerment of small and 
medium-sized states, nation branding does not provide answers to more traditional 
geopolitical concerns, such as the territorial disputes affecting Chile. Indeed, the 
geopolitical vision proposed by nation branding initiatives, which predominantly places 
weight on economic concerns, have arguably encouraged Chile to relate mostly to ‘core’ 
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nations, to the detriment of most of Latin America. There are signs that the Chilean 
authorities are trying to correct this situation, engaging with other nations within the 
region.96 Significantly, such efforts have been labelled as ‘public diplomacy’ rather than 
‘nation branding’.97 However, it is unclear whether or not these initiatives will be 
substantially different to nation branding ones. The boundaries between nation branding 
and public diplomacy are extremely blurred.98 Hence, it can perfectly be the case that 
some of the shortcomings of nation branding previously discussed end up being 
reproduced, albeit under a different name. 
Concluding Remarks 
This article has examined the viewpoints of nation branding practitioners in Chile, a 
country that since the mid-2000s has carried out various initiatives to try to shake off the 
uncomfortable past of Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship, creating a ‘new’ image that fits 
into a globalised and neoliberal world. The case of Chile shows how nation branding is a 
manifestation of the struggles for visibility that characterise contemporary societies,99
with nations competing to achieve recognition, while at the same time becoming subjects 
of external control.100 Significantly, understanding nation branding within the prism of 
geopolitical visions and visibility, as suggested in this article, invites an examination not 
only of what can be seen –that is, the outcomes of specific campaigns–, but also of the 
beliefs and practices of the individuals behind nation branding efforts.  
The interviews conducted for this article shed light on the complexity of nation branding, 
and some of its implications for the study of geopolitics, from an empirical perspective. 
They corroborated how nation branding is understood as a series of practices driven and 
framed by mostly economic goals. The interviewees stressed three areas of tension, 
which highlighted the disputes surrounding the what, the how and for whom of nation 
branding: (1) the conflicting purposes guiding the practice of nation branding, (2) the 
difficulties around the operationalisation of nation branding and (3) the controversies 
regarding the intended audiences for their efforts. The three areas of tension show that 
nation branding is far from being an orchestrated effort or a neoliberal conspiracy. 
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Practitioners continuously face struggles in order to construct and project versions of 
national identity.  
Significantly, the issues raised by the interviewees point out how nation branding has 
severe structural flaws that make the delivery of its promises impossible. I highlight 
three. Firstly, nation branding advocates promise to create and give visibility to an 
orderly and unique portrayal of the nation, to make it stand out in the global market. 
Indeed, in the case of Chile, the interviewees agreed there was consensus that the country 
was projected predominantly as an economic unit. However, the different aims and 
agendas of all the organisations trying to develop portrayals of Chile, as well as the 
pressures they faced from other actors within the state, made the coordination of such 
portrayals an almost insurmountable task. Secondly, practitioners admitted that they 
operate on shaky grounds, without clear guidance on how to empirically conduct and 
evaluate their efforts. With no clear path of operationalisation and the difficulty of 
reaching consensus in regards to what make visible of the nation, when agreement 
amongst the actors was reached, shallow and unoriginal versions of national identity 
constituting the ‘brand’ were put forward. Thirdly, whilst nation branding promises to 
level the international arena, giving more opportunities to small and medium-sized 
nations to advance their agendas, in practice it is underpinned on geopolitical visions that 
reproduce asymmetrical power relations, with ‘peripheral’ nations struggling to capture 
the attention of ‘core’ ones. Furthermore, nation branding provides no answer to more 
traditional geopolitical concerns, such as territorial sovereignty disputes.  
It is quite possible that the significant flaws in nation branding as well as an absence of 
concrete results will reduce its influence amongst governments in the near future, 
particularly those from ‘emerging’ or ‘developing’ nations. This does not mean that the 
task of developing portrayals of the nation for foreigners will be abandoned. As stated 
earlier, the concept of public diplomacy has been increasingly used in Chile, particularly 
in connection with the fraught relationships with neighbouring countries. Public 
diplomacy is traditionally understood as a task of ministries of foreign affairs rather than 
public relations managers. Hence, its practitioners have gained more respectability given 
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that they are portrayed as part of the diplomatic body of a government rather than as 
communication consultants or propagandists.101 In practice that reframing may not 
necessarily be a clear departure from nation branding efforts, given that the term public 
diplomacy often denominates the very same activities currently carried out by nation 
branding practitioners.102 Furthermore, nation branding should be seen more as a 
manifestation rather than the cause of the increasing understanding of the nation in 
mostly economic terms, as well as the embracing of branding and advertising language 
and techniques by the state.103 Hence, while the phenomenon of nation branding may 
soon disappear,104 the conditions that facilitated its emergence and dissemination remain.  
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